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This paper studies the interdependence between property insurance and portfolio selection. 
The insurance premium of property loss is shown to play the role of subsistence consumption 
in the analysis. Then, “security” becomes a necessity good and an increase in any insurance 
parameter would make the investor more “conservative.” The effect of a stock market 
parameter on the marginal propensity to insure is shown to be opposite that on the marginal 
propensity to consume. Consequently, an increase in volatility would encourage those with a 
greater-than-unity relative risk aversion to purchase more insurance at the expense of current 
consumption. 
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In general, insuring property loss and investing in risky assets are studied sepa-
rately in the literature. While random shocks to each decision problem may not
be related, the decisions usually are. For example, the stock market often reacts
negatively to bad news according to conventional wisdom. Would investors adjust
their investments when facing a graver danger of property loss? More speciﬁcally,
would investors in New Orleans change their portfolio after Katrina? Similarly,
insurance coverage may respond to the stock market ﬂuctuation, especially when
the market becomes more volatile. In what way is property insurance inﬂuenced
by the stock market parameters? Would the economic agent reduce her insur-
ance coverage during market downturns? To understand the cause and eﬀect of
such interdependence, we present a theory of optimal consumption, insurance and
portfolio rules when shocks to property loss and shocks to capital markets are
independent.
This paper is an extension of the theory of saving and insurance. In this the-
ory, insuring properties and saving are two alternatives for current consumption.
Major contributions include static model of Moﬀet (1977), discrete-time models of
Dionne and Eeckhoudt (1984) and Gollier (2001), and continuous-time models of
Briys (1986, 88), Gollier (1994) and Somerville (2004). The capital market therein
is a simple risk-free bond market with a constant rate of return. As pointed out in
Sandmo (1969), it is incomplete to analyze saving behavior without considering
capital risk in the process. This paper sheds some light on this issue by including
risky assets in a consumer’s savings portfolio.
This paper is also an extension of the theory of consumption and portfolio se-
2lection of Samuelson (1969) and Merton (1971). Major contributions in discrete-
time models since the publication of their seminal papers are succinctly presented
in Gollier (2001). The development in continuous time has a special place in ﬁ-
nance, most notably, by Karatzas, Lehoczky, Sethi and Shreve (1986), Cox and
Huang (1989, 1991), Merton (1990), Bodie, Merton and Samuelson (1992), Vila
and Zariphopoulou (1997), and Duﬃe, Fleming, Soner and Zariphopoulou (1997).
However, none of the aforementioned works consider property insurance in their
analysis. Since investors also face the possibility of accidents and property dam-
ages in their lifetimes, the inclusion of the property insurance in the portfolio
selection theory is yet another extension of this branch of the literature.
In order to examine the cause and eﬀect of interdependence between portfo-
lio selection and property insurance, we assume that respective shocks are inde-
pendent. Indeed, the risks involved in property loss, e.g., ﬁre hazards or auto
accidents, are generally considered as having no direct impact on stock market
ﬂuctuations. Conversely, ﬁnancial risks generally do not cause ﬁre hazards or
auto accidents either. Allowing dependence between the two shocks will no doubt
make the model more general and add another dimension of interdependence.
However, from modeling viewpoints, it would inevitably complicate and convo-
lute the analysis. For this reason, we do not consider this variant in the paper.
It should be mentioned that there is a literature on the interdependence be-
tween insurance purchase and portfolio selection. However, most of the authors
assume that insurance purchase and risky investments face the same risk. For
example, Briys (1988) assumed risky assets are also subject to some damages in
addition to their underlying ﬂuctuations. Meyer and Ormiston (1995) allowed a
consumer to purchase insurance on risky assets. Their ﬁndings are complements,
3not substitutes, to this paper.
The exception is Mayers and Smith (1983) in which insurance contracts are
treated as a subset of assets of an individual’s portfolio. Their paper is static, and
is cast in the mean-variance framework of portfolio selection. As such, they do
not consider the probabilistic nature of property loss. Their objective is to ﬁnd
factors aﬀecting insurance purchase. In contrast, we have a dynamic portfolio
selection model that includes property insurance. In addition to ﬁnding factors
inﬂuencing insurance purchase, we analyze the eﬀect of insurance parameters on
portfolio selection. This paper can thus be considered as a dynamic extension of
Mayers and Smith (1983).
To make the model tractable, we assume the following: Shocks to assets are
stationary and mutually independent. Property loss is modeled as an income risk,
where the size and the probability of loss are constant over time. The utility func-
tion exhibits constant relative risk aversion (CRRA). Under these assumptions,
we show that the insurance premium for property loss plays the role of subsis-
tence consumption. Then, the problem of insurance and portfolio selection can be
simpliﬁed as a standard consumption-portfolio problem when the utility function
takes the intertemporal Stone-Geary form.
The presence of the subsistence consumption suggests that, to avoid a streak
of bad luck, a consumer must, at any point in time, allocate suﬃcient resources
to cover the current and future subsistence consumption. The wealth in excess of
the sum of discounted insurance premiums of current and future losses is called
the disposable wealth. A suﬃcient condition is imposed to ensure that the dis-
posable wealth is positive at all times with probability one. Then we show that
the dynamic optimization problem has a closed form solution and that the opti-
4mal consumption in both states, investments in the risky assets, and insurance
purchases are all linear functions of disposable wealth.
To disentangle the taste parameter from the market parameters, we apply the
Arrow-Pratt approximation to the ﬁrst order conditions of the dynamic optimiza-
tion problem. Then the optimal policies are functions of the degree of relative risk
aversion, the insurance parameters and the means and variances of risky assets.
Using these closed form representations, we arrive at the following comparative
dynamics.
An increase in the loading factor, the size or the probability of loss raises the
subsistence consumption, which in turn makes the investor more conservative in
the sense that they substitute the risk-free asset for risky assets. The theory thus
predicts that people in the area prone to hazards would not be too cavalier in
their investment. Furthermore, the presence of the subsistence consumption in
the analysis also reverses a claim by Arrow (1965) that “security” (the risk-free
asset) is a luxury good. Speciﬁcally, we show that the demand for the risk-free
asset is linear in wealth with a positive intercept and hence is a necessity good.
Similarly, risky assets are all luxury goods in this case.
Since the probability of loss and the loading factor enter the relative price of
insurance, a change in either one of them would also produce a substitution eﬀect
between diﬀerent states of consumption. The net eﬀect is the aggregate of this
substitution eﬀect and the aforementioned negative wealth eﬀect on consumption
due to a reduction in disposable wealth. We show that an increased loading factor
tends to lower the consumption in the hazardous state.
The eﬀect of increased probability of loss on consumption has a third eﬀect:
it changes the marginal rate of substitution between the two states by increasing
5the willingness to insure. We show that if the consumer is not very risk averse,
the willingness-to-insure eﬀect would be dominated by the other two eﬀects. Con-
sequently, the eﬀect of increased probability would also lower the consumption in
the hazardous state.
The stock market eﬀect on property insurance turns out to be closely related
to the classic theory of optimal savings under uncertainty. The reason is that
stock market parameters aﬀect property insurance solely through their eﬀect on
the marginal propensity to insure out of wealth. We show that these parametric
eﬀects on the marginal propensity to insure are exactly opposite of that on the
marginal propensity to consume. Insurance behaves as an alternative to current
consumption when stock market parameters are changed. According to Levhari
and Srinivasan (1969), when the utility function is isoelastic, an increase in uncer-
tainty increases current consumption if the degree of relative risk aversion is less
than unity. Sandmo (1970) interpreted this result as when the substitution eﬀect
dominates the wealth eﬀect of increasing risk. When the degree of relative risk
aversion is greater than unity, the increasing risk eﬀect on current consumption is
negative; the eﬀe c ti sn e u t r a li ft h ed e g r e ei su n i t a r y .
We show that we can replace “an increase in uncertainty” with “an increase
in the variance” or “a decrease in the mean” of any risky asset. Since the stock
market parameters do not enter the relative price of insurance, the result applies
to consumption in both states. Thus, in the case that the relative risk aversion is
less than unity, a decrease in the mean or an increase in the variance of any risky
asset would increase consumption in both states and decrease property insurance.
The theory predicts that there would be cutbacks in insurance coverage in more
volatile times if the consumer is not very risk averse.
6In general, we ﬁnd that property insurance and investments are interdepen-
dent, even though we assume their risks are independent. However, there are two
separation theorems of insurance that should be mentioned. When the insurance
market is actuarially fair, the consumer is fully insured and, hence, property in-
surance is independent of all parameters except the size of property loss. This
is quite intuitive and fully expected. When the utility function is of logarithmic
form, i.e., exhibiting unitary relative risk aversion, the means and variances of
the risky assets have no eﬀect on consumption or insurance. This is also intuitive
because the wealth eﬀect of increasing risk is exactly oﬀset by the substitution
eﬀect.
2. Capital Risk and Property Loss
The structure of discrete-time portfolio selection is modeled after Samuelson (1969)
and Gollier (2001). Assume there are n+1assets in the consumer’s portfolio with
(n +1 ) -th asset being risk-free. Let r and εi,t be, respectively, the risk-free rate
of return and the random rate of return to asset i at time t, i =1 ,2,...,n. Follow-
ing Samuelson (1969), consumption xt and investments are assumed to be taken
place at the beginning o ft h et i m ep e r i o d . L e tαi,t and mt b e ,r e s p e c t i v e l y ,t h e
investment in the i-th asset and the investment in the risk-free asset at time t;
together with xt they exhaust the total resources, i.e.,




Then the wealth passes on to the next period is




7Hence the budget equation can be written as
wt+1 =( 1+r)(wt − xt)+
n X
i=1
αi,t (εi,t − r). (1)
In addition to capital risk, the consumer also faces the possibility of property
loss. We assume property losses are identical and independent distributed (i.i.d.)
over time and are also independent of the excess returns of risky assets {εi,t − r},
i =1 ,2,...,n. The reason for the last independence is that the risk of property
loss (such as ﬁre hazards and auto accidents) is not related to capital risk. To
make the model tractable, we assume a two-state framework for property loss as
in the classic insurance literature so that, at any point in time, the world is either
in the hazardous state suﬀe r i n gal o s so fL with probability π,w h e r e0 <π<1,
or in the good state without loss with probability 1 − π.
We assume that the consumer does not diversify her loss over time and that
the insurance premium is funded by the allocation of xt alone. See, for example,
Gollier (2001, 2003) for a discussion and modeling of time diversiﬁcation. In
other words, property loss presents only income risk to the consumer. Modeling
insurance ﬁnancing this way, the insurance premium does not enter the budget
equation (1). As such, the model does not automatically generate intertemporal
substitution arising from property loss so that we can obtain some insight into the
interdependence between the two markets without the said substitution eﬀect.
Assume the loading factor of the insurance market is   ≥ 1.I ft h ef a c ev a l u e
o fi n s u r a n c ec o v e r a g ea tt i m et is ft, then the insurance premium is  πft.T h e n
the consumption in the hazardous state is
c1,t = xt −  πft − L + ft,
8and the consumption in good state is
c2,t = xt −  πft,
while the budget equation (1) remains the same.
Assume the utility function u(c) is state independent, depending only on the
amount of consumption and is strictly increasing and strictly concave in c.T h e n
the consumer’s problem is to maximize the expected lifetime utility by choosing
the spending allocation {xt}, the portfolio selection {αi,t}
n
i=1, and property in-








t ([πu(c1,t)+( 1− π)u(c2,t)]) (2)
s.t. (1),a n dg i v e nw(0).
3. Insurance Premium as Subsistence consumption














s.t. (1),a n dg i v e nw(0),
i.e., the problem can be solved in two stages. In the ﬁrst stage, for any feasible




[πu(c1,t)+( 1− π)u(c2,t)]. (3)
9Since the insurance premium is funded by xt alone, we can denote the value
function of (3) by v(xt). In the second stage, the consumer chooses {xt} and







tv(xt), s.t. (1),a n dg i v e nw(0).( 4 )
This is a standard portfolio selection problem.






 (1 − π)
1 −  π
= M. (5)


















/B, for all γ>0,
where
B =  π + M
1/γ (1 −  π).
Consequently, the consumption in the hazardous state is
c1,t = xt − L +( 1−  π)ft =( xt −  πL)/B,
and the consumption in the good state is
c2,t = M
1/γc1,t = M
1/γ (xt −  πL)/B.








10When γ =1 , B =   and the value function is
v(xt)=l o g( xt −  πL) − log  +( 1− π)logM.
To solve the second stage optimization problem (4) for γ>0 and γ 6=1 ,w e













, s.t. (1),a n dg i v e nw0,( 6 )
because the diﬀerence between (4) and (6) is a constant multiplicative factor of







t log(xt −  πL), s.t. (1),a n dg i v e nw0,( 7 )
because (1 − π)logM − log  is a constant.
Since  π is the price of insurance,  πL is the insurance premium of property
loss L. The utility function in (6) or (7) is deﬁned only for xt >  π L .I nc o n s u m e r
theory, this minimum level of consumption is often referred to as the subsistence
consumption. See, for example, Layard and Walters (1978). The objective func-
tion in (6) is referred to as the intertemporal Stone-Geary utility function. In port-
folio theory, such a function exhibits hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA).
An important feature of Problem (6) is that Problem (2) has been reduced to a
“pure” consumption-portfolio problem when the insurance premium of property
loss,  πL, enters the utility function as the subsistence consumption.
4. Closed Form Solution for the Portfolio Problem
Assume the excess returns of risky assets {εi,t − r},t=0 ,1,2,..., are stationary
and mutually independent. In the inﬁnite horizon setting, the current value of













, s.t. (1),a n dg i v e nwt
is independent of the “initial” time t, dependant only on the “initial” wealth wt.
Henceforth, it is denoted by J (wt). This value function satisﬁes the Bellman
equation
J (wt)= m a x
xt,α1,t,...,αn,t
(






The ﬁrst-order conditions of the Bellman equation are















=0 ,i=1 ,2,...,n,t =0 ,1,2,... (10)
The assumption of stationary excess returns allows us to drop the subscript t
so that εi,t is denoted by εi to simplify the notation. It also reduces the system of
equations (10) to a system of only n equations. Applying the envelope theorem










Then, the ﬁrst order condition (9) can be written as




Recall that  πL is the subsistence consumption at any point in time. Therefore,
the total discounted subsistence consumption over the remaining lifetime including













12Call wt −(1 + r) πL/r t h ed i s p o s a b l ew e a l t ha tt i m et. Following Gollier (2001),
we guess the value function to be of the form
J (wt)=K




where K>0 is a constant to be speciﬁed below.
The motivation for guessing this form of value function is quite intuitive. From
(11),w eh a v e
xt −  πL = K [wt − (1 + r) πL/r]. (13)
A simple algebraic manipulation shows that the disposable wealth at time t +1
is of the form
wt+1 − (1 + r) πL/r
=( 1 + r)(1− K)[wt − (1 + r) πL/r]+
n X
i=1
αi,t (εi − r).
If the risky investments are also stationary and linear in the disposable wealth,
i.e., if
αi,t = bi [wt − (1 + r) πL/r],i=1 ,2,...,n, (14)
for some coeﬃcient bi so that the Bellman equation is an equation expressed solely
in the order of [wt − (1 + r) πL/r]
1−γ, then a closed form solution is possible.
Formally, let {bi}
n
i=1 be the solutions to the system of equations
E
"Ã
(1 + r)(1− K)+
n X
i=1




=0 ,i=1 ,2,...,n. (15)





(1 + r)(1− K)+
n X
i=1
bi (εi − r)
!1−γ⎤
⎦. (16)
13The coeﬃcient K is chosen to be the solution of (16).I no t h e rw o r d s ,bi and K are
the solutions to the system of n +1equations, (15) and (16).B yd e ﬁnition, the
coeﬃcient K is determined exclusively by the parameters in the capital market;
the parameters of the insurance market do not aﬀect this coeﬃcient. It should be
mentioned that, from (13),t h ec o e ﬃcient K = dxt/dwt has the interpretation of
marginal propensity to consumer out of wealth.
Using value function (12), the optimal spending allocation at time t is (13),
the optimal consumption in the hazardous state is
c1,t = K [wt − (1 + r) πL/r]/B, (17)
and the optimal consumption in the good state is
c2,t = M
1/γK [wt − (1 + r) πL/r]/B, (18)
the optimal investment in a risky asset is (14) and the optimal property insurance
is















Notice that all optimal policy functions are linear in wt − (1 + r) πL/r.
Is the disposable wealth positive with probability one? If so, then, from (17)
and (18), consumption in both states are positive at all times and with probability
one. Similarly, from (19), ft <L ,i f >1 (and K>0), i.e., full insurance is not
optimal if the insurance market is not actuarially fair. Moreover, from (13),w e
have xt >  π Lwith probability one, i.e., the resource optimally allocated to each
time period is more than enough to cover the subsistence consumption.
As discussed above, the disposable wealth satisﬁes the following stochastic
14diﬀerence equation
wt+1 − (1 + r) πL/r =
"
(1 + r)(1− K)+
n X
i=1
bi (εi − r)
#
[wt − (1 + r) πL/r],
(20)
with expected (gross) growth rate
g = E
"
(1 + r)(1− K)+
n X
i=1





bi (μi − r).
(21)
Even if the initial disposable wealth, w0 − (1 + r) πL/r > 0,i sl a r g e ,as t r e a k
of bad luck (with some εi assuming suﬃciently large negative values) would drive
the disposable wealth into negative values at some time. That is, all εi’s must be
bounded from below is a necessary condition for positive disposable wealth at all
times with probability one. A suﬃcient condition is w0 − (1 + r) πL/r > 0 and
n X
i=1
bi (r − hi) < (1 + r)(1− K), (22)
where hi =m i n εi with r>h i. The economic content of this condition would
become clear once K and bi are solved in closed form.





















(1 + r)β +
n X
i=1
bi (εi − r)
!#)
.
In this case, K =1− β, B =  ,a n d
ft = L −
(  − 1)(1 − β)










is completely independent of means and variances of risky assets.
155. Decoding Coeﬃcients K and bi
To have a better understanding of the coeﬃcients K and bi’s, we apply the Arrow-






i. By assumption, σ2
i is small. Since μi − r is the
expected excess return on risky asset i, we can assume that it is fairly small, a
fact supported by the ﬁndings of Kocherlakota (1996). Then we can ignore second
and higher order terms that involve μi−r and σ2
i when we apply the Taylor series
expansion about g,d e ﬁned in (21),t o[(1 + r)(1− K)+
Pn
i=1 bi (εi − r)]
−γ and
[(1 + r)(1− K)+
Pn
i=1 bi (εi − r)]





































since εi − r and εj − r are mutually independent.
The approximation allows us to ﬁnd closed form representation of K and
bi in terms μi, σ2
i, r,a n dγ. The results are summarized below with detailed









The marginal propensity to consume is
K =1−
(
β (1 + r)






16The expected growth rate of disposable wealth, and the point around which the
Taylor theorem applies, is
g =
½
















Using the approximation, the condition (22) for ensuring that the disposable
wealth is positive at all time and with probability one becomes
n X
i=1




It is well-known that the Sharpe ratio (μi − r)/σi of a risky asset is usually small.
The proposed inequality thus requires that the ratio (μi − hi)/σi would be rela-
tively small as well.
An immediate corollary of (28) is H<γbecause hi <r . Substituting H<γ
into (25), the expected growth rate of disposable wealth is positive, g>0.I t
follows that, from (27), bi > 0 for all i, i.e., there is no short sale of any risky











by substituting (24), (25),a n d(27) into (22).
17Substituting H<γinto (24),w eh a v eK<1, i.e., the marginal propensity to





then, from (26),w eh a v eK>0 and the marginal propensity to consume is
positive. When γ =1 , the above inequality is reduced to β<1.N o t i c e t h a t
K>0 also implies a positive marginal utility of wealth, from (12). The proposed
inequality (29) is a joint condition on the subjective discount factor β,t h em a r k e t
interest rate r, the risk aversion γ and the sum of squared Sharpe-ratios H. Such
a condition on exogenous parameters that ensures a positive marginal utility of




By deﬁnition, the demand for risk-free asset, mt,i smt = wt − xt −
Pn
i=1 αi,t.














































18For example, when γ =1and β =1 /(1 + r), the lower bound in (30) is zero.
What is
Pn
i=1 (μi − r)/(σ2
i)? In continuos time models, if the utility function
exhibits CRRA and asset prices follow geometric Brownian motions, then the
share of wealth invested in the i-th risky asset is a constant si =( μi − r)/(γσ2
i).
See, for example, Merton (1971, 1990) and Chang (2004). In that case, a positive
investment in the risk-free asset requires
Pn
i=1 si < 1, i.e.,
Pn
i=1 (μi − r)/(σ2
i) <
γ. The proposed condition (30) is a generalization of this continuous-time result.
Under the condition of (30), mt rises with  , π,o rL.F r o m(14),a ni n c r e a s e
in  , π,o rL would lower the disposable wealth and hence reduces the investment
in the risky assets αi,t. In other words, an increase in any insurance parameter,
be that the loading factor  , the probability of loss π or the loss L,w o u l dm a k e
the consumer more “conservative” in the sense of substituting the risk-free asset
for risky assets. The theory thus predicts that, other things being equal, investors
living in the areas prone to hazards would invest more in the risk-free asset.
6.2. Is Security a Luxury Good?
In the classic, static theory of portfolio selection, Arrow (1965) showed that the
risk-free asset (“security”) can never be a necessity good if the utility function ex-
hibits non-decreasing relative risk aversion. His luxury-good result was weakened
by Sandmo (1969, p.595) in a two-period model to the conclusion that the wealth
elasticity of the risk-free asset is at least as great as that of the risky asset.
In this paper we provide a counterexample to Arrow’s claim and reverse
Sandmo’s inequality. Speciﬁc a l l y ,i fp r o p e r t yl o s si sp r e s e n ti nt h em o d e la n d
the utility function exhibits constant relative risk aversion, then security is a ne-
cessity good. This is because, as a function of wealth, the subsistence consumption
19g e n e r a t e sap o s i t i v ei n t e r c e p ts ot h a tt h ed e m a n df o rt h er i s k - f r e ea s s e ti so f“ K e y -
nesian” form. Moreover, the demand for a risky asset as shown in (14) is linear
in wealth with a negative intercept, i.e., the wealth elasticity of any risky asset
is greater than unity. Sandmo’s inequality is reversed because all risky assets are
luxury goods, while security is a necessity good.
6.3. Consumption Falls as Hazard Rises
An increase in L lowers the disposable wealth, which produces a negative wealth
eﬀect on consumption in both states. This intuition is veriﬁed as ∂ci/∂L < 0,
i =1 ,2.
An increase in the loading factor   has two eﬀects on consumption. The ﬁrst is
through disposable wealth, which lowers consumption in both states. The second
is through the increase on the relative price of insurance,  π/(1 −  π),w h i c h
produces a substitution eﬀect that decreases c1 and increases c2.I ts u g g e s t st h a t
the loading factor is likely to have a negative eﬀect on c1.As u ﬃcient condition




M1/γ (1 − γ π)
γ 
> 0.
Recall that  π is the insurance premium for $1 coverage, which is fairly small.








rises with  , the net eﬀect on c2 is ambiguous as expected.
The eﬀect of an increased probability of loss on consumption is generally am-
biguous because there are three eﬀects on consumption. The ﬁrst is the negative
20wealth eﬀect on consumption in both states. The second is the relative price ef-
fect, which tends to substitute c2 for c1. Again, these two eﬀects tend to lower the
consumption in the hazardous state. The third eﬀe c ti st h a ta ni n c r e a s e dπ alters
the marginal rate of substitution between the two states in such a way that the
willingness to insure is increased at all points. That is, the third eﬀect on c1 works
in the opposite direction of the ﬁrst two, and the net eﬀect could be ambiguous.
However, if the investor is not very risk averse, then the third eﬀect, which
arises from the willingness to insure, would be relatively small. Then an unam-
biguous result would emerge. We claim that if γ ≤ 1,t h e nc1 would fall as π rises.
To prove it, we note that when γ =1 , B =   and ∂B/∂π =0 . In this case, only
the (negative) wealth eﬀect matters. When γ<1,w eh a v eM1/γ−1 > 1 and
∂B
∂π
=   +
 M1/γ−1
γ
(  − 1) − γ (1 − π)




(  − 1) − γ (1 − π)




(1 − γ)(  − 1)
1 −  π
> 0.
7. Capital Market Eﬀects
A capital market parameter, except the interest rate r,a ﬀects consumption and
insurance through the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth, K.A d i -
rect comparison of (17), (18),a n d(19) shows that the capital market eﬀect on
insurance is exactly opposite that on consumption. Insurance is an alternative to
current consumption when responding to stock market changes. As such, the in-
terdependence of property insurance on capital market is closely tied to the classic
theory of optimal savings under uncertainty.
As shown in Levhari and Srinivasan (1969) and Sandmo (1970), if the utility
exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA), then an increase in capital risk
21produces an income eﬀect and a substitution eﬀect on current consumption. The
income eﬀect decreases current consumption because it amounts to a reduction
in income. The substitution eﬀect increases current consumption so as to prevent
earnings from losing to capital market ﬂuctuation. They showed that the substi-
tution eﬀect dominates the income eﬀect if 0 <γ<1. The result is reversed if
γ>1; there is no capital risk on consumption if γ =1 .
7.1. Property insurance as Saving
The classic theory of optimal savings under uncertainty extends to the current
model. It is straightforward to verify, from (24),t h a t∂K/∂H > 0 if γ>1,
∂K/∂H < 0 if 0 <γ<1,a n d∂K/∂H =0if γ =1 . Since the Sharpe ratio of
a risky asset is positively related to μi and negatively related to σi,t h ee ﬀects
of the means and variances of risky assets on consumption in either state and on
insurance purchase are, for all i =1 ,2,...,n, and j =1 ,2,
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
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∂μi > 0 and
∂f
∂σi < 0,i f 0 <γ<1,
(31)
The theory predicts that an increase in stock market volatility would make
people cut back on their property insurance provided that they are not very risk
averse. For people who are somewhat risk averse in the sense of γ>1,t h e yw o u l d
increase their protection of their property in a volatile stock market.
The interest rate eﬀect on consumption and insurance has two components.
O n ei st h ed i s p o s a b l ew e a l t he ﬀect that an increase in the interest rate r increases
the disposable wealth wt− πL/r, and hence consumption. The other is through its
22eﬀect on the marginal propensity to consume K, because it has a negative eﬀect on
the Sharpe ratio. These two eﬀects could work in the opposite direction if γ>1.
The unambiguous case is that the interest rate would produce a positive eﬀect on
consumption in both states and a negative eﬀect on insurance if 0 <γ≤ 1.
7.2. Separation Results
There are two special cases in which insurance decision is independent of stock
market parameters. One is the benchmark case of fair insurance   =1(and
M =1 ). The demand for insurance as given in (19) becomes ft = L,a n dt h e
consumer is fully insured. This is an extension of the separability result of, e.g.,
Dionne and Eeckhoudt (1984), Briys (1986, p.720), and Somerville (2004, p.1134).
The other is the case of logarithmic utility function as shown in (23).I ts h o u l d
be mentioned that Briys (1986), by introducing a Poisson process of property loss
in the asset equation (1), showed that insurance is independent of consumption if
0 <γ<1. Obviously, such a separation result is sensitive to model speciﬁcation.
8. Conclusion
Intuitively, for an investor who is determining the optimal consumption and port-
folio rules, the presence of property loss would mean a loss in wealth. If, in addi-
tion, she does not diversify her losses over time, then she must allocate resources
to each time period more than enough to cover the insurance premium. This pa-
per formalizes this intuition by showing that the insurance premium of property
loss plays the role of subsistence consumption in the investor’s decision making.
Consequently, the risk-free asset becomes a necessity good, and any insurance pa-
rameter that increases the premium would produce a portfolio substitution from
23risky assets to the risk-free asset.
It is equally intuitive that, when risky assets are included in one’s savings
portfolio, a consumer who is making saving and insurance decisions must now solve
the classic theory of optimal savings under uncertainty, especially its dependence
on the attitude toward risk. This paper generalizes the classic result by showing
that an increase in uncertainty means an increase in the variance or a decrease in
the expected rates of return of a risky asset. Moreover, as an inferior good, the
demand for insurance purchase responds to stock market parameters in exactly
the opposite way of consumption.
There are at least three directions that we can extend this model. Assuming a
general concave utility function instead of a CRRA utility function, we will have
to replace the concept of subsistence consumption with the concept of certainty
equivalent. Assuming shocks to risky assets are serially correlated, we may no
longer have the closed form representation for the value function, which in turn
would make the analysis more complicated and render some results ambiguous.
Finally, assuming time diversiﬁcation in the model, we may not have the closed
form solution to the problem. We will need other solution methods, including
numerical ones to tackle the problem.
249. Appendix: Derivation of the Value Function






































Applying the Arrow-Pratt approximation to [(1 + r)(1− K)+
Pn
i=1 bi (εi − r)]
−γ
about the mean g =( 1+r)(1− K)+
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Solving the above equation, we have (27).U s i n g(27),
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w h i c hi nt u r ni m p l i e s
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Once again, we apply the Arrow-Pratt approximation about the same mean g to
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which implies (24). Substituting (24) into (32),
g =
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